The Transfer of the Trench Warfare Research Department.
The disintegration of Jackson's Trench Warfare Department coincided with a wider reorganisation of the Ministry of Munitions as it absorbed the remaining functions of the War Office relating to the design and quality standards of equipment issued to the army.
Sir Alexander Roger’s Trench Warfare Supply Department survived the subsequent upheaval virtually intact, but General Jackson’s Trench Warfare Research Department was not so fortunate. Dr Addison considered it too small to stand as a separate department continually preyed upon by the Department of Munitions Research. His solution was to revisit his original proposal for the incorporation of Section FW3A into the Ministry of Munitions and embed Jackson’s department within a larger department, the newly created Department of Munitions Design, with Jackson retaining his position as Director-General and having authority over his department similar to that exercised by any other Director-General but drawing on the host department for administrative support.
Established in December 1915 with General Du Cane as Director-General, the Design Department took over the Directorate of Artillery’s responsibilities for the design and specification of all artillery matters, rifles, machine guns, and small arms ammunition. It was a department stuffed with Jackson’s critics and political enemies and with a Director-General who objected to Addison’s proposed administrative arrangement for Jackson and his staff.
Addison records in his diary,
Wednesday, December 8, 1915.
I finally fixed up an arrangement with Du Cane and LG which I hope will be satisfactory. It will give Jackson an absolute free hand to retain scientific workers and have the final say in designs, inventions, etc so far as they concern his branch, so that he will be able to get things determined instead of waiting on the decisions of others.
Given Du Cane’s personality, Addison’s proposal was doomed from the start. Du Cane was an individual whose concerns about his status and position within the Ministry’s hierarchy bordered on the pathological. From the moment Jackson’s transfer was mooted, he protested in the strongest terms about the proposal, incensed at what he saw as a very public diminution of his status through not having control over all the activities in his department. He was doubly affronted by a perceived breach of the Army Order of Precedence by Addison, placing an officer of inferior rank in his department to hold the same position in the Ministry as he did. Moreover, Jackson was an engineer officer in charge of a department that conducted experiments and developed munitions of an explosive nature that were properly the responsibility of an artillerist.
Du Cane’s style was micro-management, down to the smallest detail, delegating little independence to his staff, most of whom were based at Woolwich and Shoeburyness, discharging the same functions as they did under the War Office. They were expected to execute his directives without question, as though they were military orders and while military officers may have been comfortable with Du Cane managing his department in military mode, others did not, particularly the scientists who populated Jackson’s Chemical Advisory Committee.
Du Cane’s binding belief was that Lloyd George had personally appointed him to lead the Design Department, and this gave him the unique authority to act as the final arbiter in all matters relating to the design and modification of munitions across the Ministry, irrespective of the department or section undertaking the work. Based on this belief, he first attempted to bring Jackson under his control as early as November 1915. He summoned Jackson, who was still Director-General of the independent Trench Warfare Department, to a meeting to explain how he proposed to conduct their relationship once he and his staff were transferred. Aware of Du Cane’s reputation, Jackson took the precaution of attending with witnesses who were not part of his department. Du Cane informed Jackson that Lloyd George had appointed him as the person in the Ministry responsible for munitions design, and in keeping with this mandate, he proposed to create an independent Trench Warfare Research Group, separate from Jackson’s department, that would be a subcommittee of the Ordnance Committee of which he was to be appointed Chair. He also proposed to create a Trench Warfare Secretariat within the Department of Munitions Design, answerable to himself, to receive all suggestions relating to trench warfare and recommend which were to be sent to Jackson’s department, or elsewhere in the Ministry as appropriate. Du Cane then demanded that Jackson, pulling rank as his senior officer, hand over key members of his department to serve full-time in this new structure. Jackson was so disturbed by Du Cane’s proposals, which were so contrary to the proposals put to him by Addison, that he sent a summary of the meeting to Lloyd George expressing his concerns.[1]
I have not found a reply to this memorandum, but it was written at a politically delicate time for Lloyd George, and he probably dumped it on Addison's desk. After his experiences with Sir Percy Girouard, one might have expected Addison to take action to rein in Du Cane, but perhaps this was not possible while Du Cane retained Lloyd George's confidence. Addison did draft a memorandum describing Jackson's position and responsibilities once in the Department of Munitions Design, which survives in several versions with handwritten amendments among Addison’s papers, but there is no evidence that it was circulated.[2]
Within days of the transfer of Jackson’s research department, Du Cane launched his first attack aimed at undermining its independence. His target was the Chemical Advisory Committee and its role in evaluating suggestions submitted to the War Office and the Ministry of Munitions concerning chemicals and chemical warfare. He objected to the Committee acting independently, stating he was the only person with the authority to receive suggestions relating to chemicals before deciding where, in the Ministry, they should be dealt with. Jackson resisted, pointing out that Du Cane and his staff were artillerists with no expertise in chemistry or chemical warfare, and what was proposed was a duplication of the work of the Chemical Advisory Committee.
To break the deadlock, Addison hammered out a compromise that appeared to satisfy Du Cane’s vanity by stipulating that submissions relating to chemicals would be first logged in by the Department of Munitions Design before forwarding to the Chemical Advisory Committee for consideration and action. To keep Du Cane informed about their fate, Professor Crossley, Secretary to the Chemical Advisory Committee, would be attached to the Department of Munitions Design, but only in matters related to chemistry. With Crossley reporting to him, Du Cane saw another opportunity to bid for control over chemical research.
Treating Crossley, at least for part of his time, as a member of his department, Du Cane announced that chemical submissions would be referred to Professor Crossley, who would decide their fate, and his decisions were to be treated as final. This policy would have removed from the Chemical Advisory Committee one of its primary responsibilities, and this proposal, along with a rumour that Du Cane proposed to appoint Committee members individually to the new Ordnance Committee, was too much for the chemists, who demanded a meeting with Addison to discuss their functions under the new departmental arrangements. At that meeting, Addison confirmed that the intention was to attach the whole Chemical Advisory Committee to the Ordnance Committee as a subcommittee, termed the Trench Warfare Committee, with Jackson as Chair, to advise the Ordnance Committee on all matters relating to trench warfare. Professor Crossley, as Secretary to the Committee, would continue to liaise with General Du Cane so that Munitions Design would be aware of their activities, but would not be called upon to decide any matters that rightly should be referred to the Committee as a whole.
Addison’s proposals were accepted, but a week later, Du Cane issued a memorandum detailing the organisation of the Department of Munitions Design, in which Professor Crossley’s name appeared as a special advisor to Du Cane on poisonous gases. This was too much for the chemists who wrote to Addison stating their opposition to the appointment and reminding him of his recent assurances about their independence from General Du Cane. However, before the matter could be addressed, the ongoing political wrangle between the War Office and the Ministry intruded.
Following the transfer of control over the design of munitions to the Ministry of Munitions, the Army Council became concerned that the transfer of so many military personnel, along with their key functions, might result in important considerations relating to the design of military equipment becoming lost in a civilian Ministry with no experience of the complexities that could arise when providing for the military. Someone had to ensure that any new weapon or piece of kit would be compatible with other essential equipment, such as the men’s webbing, be easy to repair, and robust enough to withstand rough handling. Lloyd George attempted to allay these concerns by appointing Du Cane as Director General of the Department of Munitions Design and assuring the War Office that military officers would hold all other senior posts, but this did not satisfy the War Office and, in March 1916, Lloyd George agreed to an increase in the military influence at the centre of the Ministry through appointing Du Cane Military Advisor to the Ministry with direct access to the Minister.[3]
One of the sacrifices made in facilitating this harmony with the War Office was the Trench Warfare Research Department.
24 March 1916, Dear Jackson,
I meant to have written to you last night and the night before, but I am sorry to say that the last two days have been so absolutely full to a late hour with intricate and difficult matters that I really have not had a moment to spare in which to do so. Various new questions have arisen which affect General Du Cane’s position and Mr Lloyd George has decided that he shall be made Military Advisor – I do not say with that title but with that function - in addition to being Head of his present department. In the circumstances, it was felt that in the interests of proper organisation, we must look to you to report to him on your work. I know you will understand that in making this arrangement neither Mr Lloyd George nor myself have any thoughts of doing anything which is suggestive of the slightest want of confidence in you or appreciation of your loyal and splendid services. It was set out in the note that we were especially anxious for you to be able to continue your good work to the best advantage, and General Du Cane is anxious also that there shall be the most cordial co-operation between you and him, and I am sure you will make the best of everything. I earnestly hope that, with your characteristic loyalty, you will be able to participate with goodwill in the new arrangement, and I hope to have a talk with you on Monday about things. I may say also that General Du Cane has not the slightest desire to interrupt the close and pleasant associations between you and myself which have hitherto existed.
Yours sincerely. Christopher Addison.
I am keeping 12.30 on Monday free for the talk which we could not have to-day.[4]
This memorandum is another example of Dr Addison’s faith that the senior staff of the Ministry could put aside personal differences and ambitions to act for the common good and give their undivided commitment to the war effort. Unfortunately, Du Cane, like several other senior managers, did not fall into that category. With his new status and authority, he felt strong enough to force through the changes in his department’s structure that he had previously been denied and moved to destroy Jackson’s department by subdividing it into two. A Research Department under Jackson, demoted from his position as Director-General, and an Experimental Department under the management of an Assistant Superintendent of Experiments.
Both the new departments reported to Du Cane, who determined what work they could undertake. Protests by Jackson went unanswered, and he submitted a letter of resignation.[5]
It was an unfortunate time to attempt to engage Dr Addison in the internal problems of the Department of Munitions Design, for he had reverted to his primary role as a politician. He was rarely seen in the Ministry as Lloyd George had made him responsible for dealing with the Parliamentary fall-out over the dismissal of Sir John French as Commander-in-Chief as well as the very onerous, and time-consuming task, of working up, then piloting through the House of Commons, the Munitions of War Amendment Act essential to make legal Lloyd George’s forced transfer of the retained functions of the War Office. Over this period, Du Cane, left to his own devices, developed his department as he saw fit.
When Addison was able to turn his attention back to the Ministry, it was clear that Du Cane’s management of his department left a lot to be desired. He had not reached a satisfactory compromise with the chemists nor resolved the endless delays and difficulties plaguing the Woolwich inspection process and now was picking a new fight with Jackson over gas shells for the 4.5-inch howitzer. Du Cane had given his artillery section the responsibility of developing a gas shell for this gun, although Jackson’s staff were the experts in this area. When the artillerists encountered problems, the War Office became more strident in its complaints about non-delivery, and Jackson stepped in to develop a modification to the standard shrapnel shell, making it suitable for the delivery of chemicals. When Du Cane was informed, he attempted to stop the issue to the BEF because, as he had not approved Jackson’s improvisation, they may be unsafe. He was overruled.
Du Cane’s continuing attempts to control or influence the Chemical Advisory Committee through the manipulation of the dual role of Professor Crossley that soon blew up into a crisis serious enough to involve Lloyd George. If Jackson and the chemists carried through their resolution to resign, the implications for the development of chemical munitions and equipment such as flares for illumination and signalling would be severe. To gain time, Addison sat on their resignations while he tried to find a way out of the impasse. In the meantime, after extracting from Jackson and the chemists an agreement that they would continue to discharge their duties if they did not have any dealings with Du Cane.
[1] TNA: MUN 5/41/263.6/18. Papers relating to the Establishment of Trench Warfare Research Department. From General Jackson’s papers.
[2] Ditto
[3] In late 1917, the military lobby again flexed its muscles, and the Director-General of the Department of Munitions Design became responsible for all military personnel working in the Ministry and its agencies, creating within the Ministry an internal structure that functioned as a mini-War Office.
[4] TNA: MUN 5/41/263.1/16. Papers relating to the Establishment of Trench Warfare Research Department. From General Jackson’s papers.
[5] Ditto