‍ ‍The Growth of Tension between Design and Supply.‍ ‍

Once the Army Council had accepted a new munition developed by the department, Alexander Roger and the Outside Engineering Branch tended to assume that its development was complete and, except for possible minor adjustments in future, bulk manufacturing could proceed. However, this was not necessarily the perception of the military officers who populated Jackson’s research division, who were aware that once a new weapon came into widespread use, issues could emerge that affect its performance or safety, requiring modification or even the redesign of components.

It was this gap in perception about when the development of a munition was complete that was the major source of tension between research and “supply”. The Outside Engineering Branch resented Jackson’s research staff wanting to make adjustments to approved items, seeing it as a vain attempt at perfection, or when introducing them into already up-and-running production lines as changes that might slow down, or even temporarily halt, manufacturing and disrupt their carefully managed supply chain.

This led to a situation in which, although physically in the same building, communication between the research and manufacturing divisions of the Trench Warfare Department began to break down, as evidenced by problems with the production of the 3-inch Stokes mortar bomb. In late 1915, various design faults and manufacturing difficulties with the bombs were delaying the introduction of the mortar, much to the annoyance of the War Office as well as endangering Mr Roger’s reputation as one of the Ministry’s most successful managers. The responsibility for completing the bomb's development and navigating its passage through the Ordnance Board lay with Jackson’s research group. Still, instead of working with them to resolve the outstanding issues, Alexander Roger instructed the Trench Mortar Section to handle it themselves. When they failed, Roger attempted to shift the blame by assailing Dr Addison with memos in which he attributed the difficulties in meeting delivery dates to Jackson’s staff making unnecessary changes to the bomb specification, making it difficult for his staff to issue contracts to the manufacturers. Having softened up Addison with this barrage of half-truths, Roger launched his main attack against Jackson in a long memorandum,

Dr Addison,

A difficult situation has arisen in this Department, probably owing to the great difficulty in laying down in advance a plan of organisation capable of dealing clearly with such a rapidly growing Department. It seems to me a difficulty however, for which a remedy should be found, and I therefore venture to seek your advice and decision on it.

I may say at once the position which I set out here is a delicate one but one which is perfectly capable of adjustment if dealt with frankly. I know that you will approach it from this standpoint, and I am confident that you will deal with it fairly.

When, on behalf of Mr Lloyd George, you did me the honour to accept my offer of service, you wrote me on the 14th June last stating that it was Mr Lloyd George’s view that I should take charge of the general business organisation of the Department, and at the same time you informed me that General Jackson was at present in Military charge of this work.

On 26th July General Jackson issued a notice in agreement with me as follows:

It is notified for general information that the responsibility for the supply of Warlike stores that have been approved rests with Mr Roger. When the stage of production has been reached (whether for experiment or for use), designs and quantities having been approved by the Director, Heads of Sections will communicate with Mr Roger as to the arrangements for purchase and manufacture.

Subsequently, on 14th September you wrote to me saying that it had become increasingly necessary to harmonise my status with that of other officers of the Ministry and stated that the Minister would be glad if I would accept the post of Deputy Director General of Trench Warfare Supply under General Jackson.

Up to the middle of September or thereabouts, letters emanating from the Department whether on supply, or otherwise, were signed either in General Jackson’s name or on his behalf.

General Jackson expressed his view about that time that, in all cases relating to supply letters must be signed “for Deputy Director General TWS.”

Accordingly, a notice was issued stating that all letters relating to supply must be signed in my name or on my behalf, and I in my turn authorised a certain number of the staff to sign letters, minutes, etc., on my behalf. Out of a staff numbering 243, the actual supply staff consists of 227, irrespective of the staff at Filling Stations. Out of a total of 2914 letters issued from this Department last week relating to supply, 95% roughly related to supply and were signed either in my name or on my behalf. In effect, the supply side of this Department may truly be said to have become a complex commercial undertaking of great size and one involving a large amount of responsibility.

Under the present circumstances however, it does not appear to be clear how far you wish General Jackson to assume responsibility for the supply side, as there has been recently a tendency of the part of the Ministry to communicate with him on questions of supply which have hitherto addressed to me and quite recently a report on supply was called for from General Jackson for the Minister and complied by him.

Hitherto, I have designedly relieved General Jackson from any of the work of carrying on the supply side, but it would seem impossible for him to answer for supply unless he is actively directing it, and you will readily understand that the indefinite position which is growing up is likely to lead to quite unnecessary friction.

I need not dilate on the vast importance of the purely military side of this Department, which probably no man in the service is more competent to deal with than General Jackson; he is already in effect a Branch of the Ordnance Board and if this position is likely to develop and intimate touch is maintained with the various fronts his responsibility and work will enormously increase. If I am stating the case rightly therefore, it would seem a very desirable thing that the organisation of the Department should be put on a more workable basis and avoid the friction which the present basis is bound to encourage and which, General Jackson and I are sincerely anxious to avoid.

26th November 1915 A Roger.[1]

This makes it clear that the responsibility for separating research and manufacturing lies with Alexander Roger and his ambition to be Director-General of his own department.

In his submission to the Historical Section of the Ministry of Munitions, he wrote,

My early association with General Jackson and the Officers that he had naturally appointed to the chief positions in the department was not satisfactory. I had to try and please the theorist, the research mind foreign to commercial ways, and I had to reconcile my ideas of running the department on experimental lines with the military and experimental spirit that met me at every turn. After compromise and compromise, I was obliged to agitate for the separation of Supply from Research that I have already discussed. Indeed, I blame myself for not having urged the change earlier and more strongly. General Jackson’s leadership of the department was only nominal, his dealings being solely with experiments and research, but the main business of the department, the business of supply, was seriously handicapped by being subordinated to matters that were rightly the concern of a separate department run on different lines.

After the separation of Supply from Research had been completed at the end of 1915, the new Supply Department was free to expand and undertake new responsibilities. I aimed at giving as much power as was practical to the Directors of the sections and to my technical assistants, with the intention of encouraging them to develop all the energy and experience that they possessed for the benefit of the department. I tried to allow each section as much play for individualism as possible, and I feel certain that the success of the department has been due to the free lines on which it has been encouraged to develop. My leading idea always was to ensure the supply of the complete round.[2]‍ ‍

We have no information on how General Jackson saw his relationship with Alexander Roger, so it is difficult to arrive at a balanced view. However, I suspect that Jackson was somewhat naïve in not understanding the cut-throat rivalry that drove ambition in a civilian organisation such as the Minister of Munitions, a factor I attribute to his training and experience as a military officer that led him to expect that his subordinates would get on with their job to the best of their ability and not indulge in behaviour that was disloyal or undermine their superiors. Unfortunately, an Edwardian military officer’s expectation of what constituted gentlemanly behaviour and loyalty did not extend to the competitive business world familiar to Alexander Roger.

It is clear from Jackson’s later writings that he viewed the separation as a significant error of judgement on the part of Dr Addison that damaged the future development of innovative trench warfare munitions. I have not found anywhere in the voluminous documents preserved in the Addison archive at Oxford, or in either of his two published books covering his years in the Ministry of Munitions, even a hint as to Addison’s reasons for splitting the Trench Warfare Department in December 1915.  

However, I do not think it was to satisfy Alexander Roger’s ego, and it is possible to make a reasonable guess. One of the endearing features of Addison’s diary entries is his enduring belief that if individuals could put aside their concerns about their importance and status it would make it much easier for them to work together in harmony for the common good, an admirable view of the nature of mankind that was to be the source of his greatest frustrations and disappointments for, in the Ministry of Munitions, he found himself managing a group of individuals whose greatest pleasure seemed to derive from being aggressive, non-cooperative and competitive. As he wrote in his diary after one fraught meeting,

One is getting a bit tired of these men everlastingly concerned with their own importance.[3]‍ ‍

This leads us to one possible explanation for Addison agreeing to separate Design from Supply, that is a recognition that the breakdown between Sir Alexander Roger and General Louis Jackson was terminal, and not wishing to lose either through resignation, he decided to remove the source of the friction by splitting the Department into two separate entities, in the hope that once the two departments could return to working harmoniously. To assist this, he continued to house them in the same building, but the antipathy between staff was so great that there was little communication between them, a situation not improved by Roger instructing his Supply Officers, many of whom were engineers, to undertake their own research when troubleshooting any defects in the design of the munitions for which they were responsible.
‍ [1] Ms Addison c72 Folio 200-202. Memo Roger to Addison.

[2] TNA: MUN5/382/1600/2. Trench Warfare Supply Department. The Director General. p.7-8.

[3] Addison, Four and a Half Years. Entry Wednesday 8 March 1915.