The Separation of Design from Supply.
Given this robust defence of the Trench Warfare Department, it is all the more baffling that ten days later, December 20th, 1915, Dr Addison approved the disaggregation of the department into two separate, but unequal, entities, the Trench Warfare Supply Department with Sir Alexander Roger as Director-General, and a much smaller Trench Warfare Research Department with Brigadier-General Jackson as Director-General.
The rationale for the creation of the Ministry of Munitions was to increase the output of munitions. When in the War Office, Jackson's Section FW3A was predominantly a research and development unit focusing on munitions and other equipment for trench warfare, but, when it joined the Ministry, this focus changed as manufacturing or “Supply”, under the management of Alexander Roger, became the dominant activity and drove the expansion of the Trench Warfare Department.
This gave rise to a divergence of vision about the department’s mission between the predominantly civilian Outside Engineering Branch, which saw this as the most important function, particularly from late 1915 onwards, after the army had adopted the Mills bomb as its only hand grenade, and the 3-inch Stokes mortar as a primary infantry support weapon, and the predominantly military research and development staff who saw developing and refining the weapons used in trench warfare as the priority.
There is little doubt that Roger, who disliked working with military officers, fostered this distinction in outlook and more experienced than Jackson in the ways and culture of a civilian bureaucracy, promoted the manufacturing successes of his division, and himself, by keeping his superiors informed of their achievements through regular reports and memoranda, while at the same time, through sins of omission, diminished the roles of others, including Jackson and his military officers. “Oh, What a tangled web we weave, when first we practice to deceive!”[1]
Any ambitions Alexander Roger may have had to replace Jackson as Director-General of the Trench Warfare Department were facilitated by decisions made by Dr Addison.
Like many other creative individuals, Jackson showed little interest in the bureaucratic functions of finance and planning, a character trait identified early by Addison, leading him to appoint Alexander Roger to advise and support Jackson in managing the business side of FW3A once it was transferred to the Ministry of Munitions. He then went further, appointing Roger Financial Director with responsibilities for the manufacturing activities of the department. Addison justified this reduction in Jackson’s authority over his department by suggesting it would relieve him of the tedious details of finance and contracts, allowing him to concentrate on more critical research.
Alexander Roger tightened his grip on the department’s manufacturing activities when Addison appointed him Chair of the Commercial Advisory Committee, a committee composed of representatives from the department’s larger suppliers who were to advise it on its manufacturing strategy, and, surprisingly, Jackson recommended Roger as Chair of the Scientific Advisory Committee, tasked with developing the department’s research strategy, particularly in relation to chemical warfare. Jackson had, in effect, forfeited control over the strategic development of his Trench Warfare Department. Roger’s authority to act independently of Jackson was further enhanced when he was appointed Deputy-General of Trench Warfare Supplies, responsible for all stages of manufacturing from the moment Jackson or the War Office had approved the final design. To assist in discharging this function, he was given the authority to hire and fire staff appointed to the manufacturing section, exercising his new authority by purging military officers, such as Captain Lister of the Stokes Mortar Section and Lieutenant Sutton for the 2-inch medium mortar, whom Jackson had appointed as Heads of Sections, and replacing them with civilian managers. This move reduced the military's input into the manufacture of trench warfare munitions, many of which were still, in military terms, experimental. It changed the department's character and ethos from one focused on research and development to a manufacturing department.
[1] Sir Walter Scott,1809, Marmion. Canto VI, stanza xvii.https://archive.org/details/marmion00scot/page/162/mode/2up (last accessed April 2020)