(iii) The Creation of the Trench Warfare Department.‍ ‍

In the early discussions between the War Office and the Ministry of Munitions on the transfer of functions, there was no mention of Section FW3A. In their analysis of the War Office’s role in the supply of munitions, the Ministry officials completely overlooked its existence, probably because its output of emergency munitions did not appear in the War Office Monthly Returns for munitions output. The first time FW3A came to the attention of the Ministry of Munitions was on May 27th at the end of the first formal meeting between the War Office and the Ministry to agree the separation of functions. At 4.30 pm, Lord Kitchener joined the meeting to review progress and confirm the transfer of the responsibility for the manufacture of munitions approved by the Army Council to the Ministry. Then, just as the meeting was ending, he turned to Dr Addison and asked him to confirm that the Ministry would assume responsibility for the supply of chlorine gas to support Jackson's research into chemical weapons. Addison, totally unaware that the War Office was preparing for chemical warfare, or that Colonel Jackson and FW3A even existed, expressed his surprise at the question to which Kitchener said he would instruct the War Office to fully disclose the activities of FW3A and suggested that Addison arrange an early meeting with Jackson to be briefed on developments in trench warfare munitions.[1]‍ ‍

The meeting took place the following afternoon, Addison recording in his diary,

‍ ‍“I found him a splendid officer. He is in charge of trench warfare at the WO with many other duties of training, etc., which do not belong to our department. I told Girouard to see K and tell him I thought that Colonel Jackson had better remain pro tem in the WO and use us in the matter of any supplies which were necessary.” [2]‍ ‍

On the Saturday morning, Dr Addison continued his education about chemical warfare,

‍ ‍ “On arrival at Whitehall Gardens this morning, I had an hour with Beilby, who placed me in full possession of the facts as to what they are doing in chemical warfare. He himself, as do I, shudders at the abyss which the Germans have opened up in the use of these hellish missiles. Without putting details down in this diary, which I cannot do in cold blood, I should not wonder that Jackson and Beilby, between them, give the enemy mightily unpleasant surprises in the very near future. The whole business is diabolical. “[3]‍ ‍

Which continued on June 1st,

‍ ‍“Had a long interview with Beilby. Jackson also came to see me yesterday. He impresses me as being uncommonly capable.” [4]‍ ‍

The next day, the Ministry of Munitions began incorporating FW3A, although no formal transfer had yet taken place, as several issues remained unresolved, the most important being that FW3A had several functions related to munitions production in addition to manufacturing. There were,

a) its research functions.

b) its method of production and inspection of the munitions for which it was responsible.

c) direct delivery to the army.

d) direct contact with the fighting troops.

e) training of troops in the use of the munitions it produced. all of which were functions of the War Office and not the Ministry.

(iv) Fitting in.‍ ‍

Once it was apparent that FW3A was destined for the Ministry of Munitions the Directorate of Artillery renewed its claim on its research and development functions, strengthening its claim with the argument that the design and development of munitions has always been the responsibility of the military whereas FW3A, as presently structured, would transfer some of that responsibility to a civilian authority setting a precedent for the Ministry of Munitions to make further excursions into War Office prerogatives. While Lord Kitchener agreed with this argument as far as it applied to conventional munitions, he agreed with Jackson that the experimental nature of the novel munitions required for trench warfare made it impossible to separate research and development from the process of manufacture, making it imperative that their development, from the moment of inception to their issue to the army, came under the control of a single authority.

Accordingly, Kitchener brokered an agreement between Lloyd George and the Army Council that the Ministry of Munitions would accept Section FW3A with all of its functions intact, and in agreeing to this arrangement, the Army Council was making a deliberate, and unprecedented, exception to the rule that it retained entire control over the type and design of any munition issued to the army. Kitchener may have made his decision but that did not mean it would be implemented by the War Office which, always sensitive of its prerogatives, did not wish to see the Ministry of Munitions, even indirectly, obtain a research and development function and put forward a counter proposal in which Jackson would split his time between overseeing manufacturing in the Ministry of Munitions and his research within the Directorate of Artillery. The War Office assured the Ministry that this would facilitate the development of new trench warfare munitions through harmonious cooperation between the two departments, a vain hope given the Directorate of Artillery's history of hostility toward FW3A's activities. The Ministry of Munitions was losing patience, and Addison had a further meeting with Kitchener to clarify what exactly he had in mind. With many other issues piling up on his desk, it was not until July 8th that Llewellyn Smith got round to writing to Sir Reginald Brade, Secretary to the War Office, to clarify the Ministry's understanding of the outcome of Addison's meeting with Kitchener,

“ Sir,

With reference to Sir Reginald Brade's letter of 22 June and to Dr Addison's conversation with Lord Kitchener on 24 June on the subject of the transfer to the Ministry of Munitions of the provision of supplies for Trench Warfare. I am directed to state that there appears to be a misunderstanding regarding the extent of the work to be transferred. The understanding arrived at with Lord Kitchener was that there should be transferred to the Ministry of Munitions not only the matters referred to in the second paragraph of Sir Reginald Brade's letter, but the provision of all munitions required for Trench Warfare and their accessories. I am to request that instructions be issued to the concerned department for this arrangement to be carried out.

I have the honour to be, Sir,

Your obedient Servant,” [5]

When at the War Office, the primary role of Jackson and FW3A had been research and development of new trench-warfare munitions, and, to that extent, organising the manufacture of their emergency grenades was a side issue. Jackson's priority was working with the chemical industry to develop the capacity to synthesise sufficient chlorine for a retaliatory attack against the Germans and perfect its release from cylinders under battlefield conditions. On the transfer of FW3A to the Ministry of Munitions, Addison viewed its role slightly differently. His emphasis was on manufacturing, the Ministry's primary function, and in his discussions with Jackson, Addison identified control over manufacturing as a major weakness. Addison recorded in his diary,

‍ ‍ “I'm afraid Jackson is rather a weak vessel in business management, and I shall put Roger in charge of this side of Trench Warfare Supplies. He is a partner of Lord St Davids, who sent him on to us. He organised the Red Cross Motor Ambulance Services and is evidently a first-rate man. Fixed up an arrangement with Glazebrook of the National Physics Laboratory to help the local committees in testing specimens, etc., and came to an agreement as to how the Royal Society might help Jackson's Department.” [6]‍ ‍

We do not know how Addison arrived at this judgement, but I suspect he was not impressed by what seemed to him to be the rather casual way in which the supply officers of FW3A went about placing contracts, with no mechanisms in place to ensure they were getting value for money. He may also have been concerned that, as military officers with no experience of the civilian commercial world, they would lack the skills required to deliver the significant increase in munitions production expected by the Ministry. On 14 June 1915 Addison wrote to Mr Alexander Roger on behalf of Lloyd George inviting him to take charge of the general business organisation and manufacturing activities of Jackson's department pointing out that although Jackson remained, at present, the military officer in charge of the department more exact arrangements, including defining his status within the department, could not be made until after the final details of the transfer had been agreed with the War Office. Alexander Roger accepted these somewhat vague conditions of his employment, a step that marked the beginning of his ascendancy within the Ministry of Munitions, leading to Jackson losing managerial control over his department.[7]‍ ‍

(v) The Departments of Munitions Supply.‍ ‍

The complexities of the transfer of FW3A and its subsequent interaction with other departments in the Ministry are essential to our understanding of the fate of the Trench Warfare Department, and as the various events can appear a bit tangled, I will try to make them as clear as I can, so please bear with me. When first created in June 1915, the Ministry of Munitions under Lloyd George consisted of three departments: the Secretariat and Labour, the Explosives Department, and the Department of Munitions Supply, the largest, under Sir Percy Girouard, who was primarily responsible for developing this administrative structure.

As previously indicated this large department had been transferred, in its entirety, from the War Office and the plural Departments is important in this context, for under the management of its Director-General, Sir Percy Girouard, were smaller departments, each with their own Deputy Director-General, responsible for the manufacture of a discrete group of munitions: small arms, machine guns, Field Artillery, Heavy Artillery, and so on. The transfer of Sir Percy and his Armaments Output Committee gave the Ministry control over the munitions industry except of the Royal Arsenals and represented a substantial increase in the authority and functions of the Ministry but this change in authority was political rather than practical, for the only experts capable of exercising control over the design and quality of munitions were those officers already undertaking such functions in the War Office and on transfer to the Departments of Munitions Supply they retained their previous conditions of service, including military rank, and continuing to discharge their responsibilities as they had always done, although at greater intensity, boosted by the management expertise of the civilian industrialists, such as Eric Geddes, recruited into the Ministry to provide the drive necessary to put the country's manufacturing assets onto a war footing.

On the transfer of FW3A, Jackson was promoted Brigadier-General and recognised as Military Director of the Trench Warfare (Supply) Department.[8] Still not fully comprehending the importance of FW3A's research functions, the civil servants who managed the Ministry of Munitions viewed this new department as primarily engaged in manufacturing. In keeping with this view, Dr Addison concluded that its most appropriate home was as one of the munitions manufacturing sub-departments within the Department of Munitions Supply. Informing Jackson, 30 June 1915’

‍ ‍“Dear Jackson, We have now, I think, completed the arrangements whereby all matters connected with trench warfare have been transferred to your department, and so as to bring the different branches of the Ministry into working relationship with one another we will in future regard your Department as the Trench Warfare Department, of which you are the Military Director, as one of the Departments of Munitions Supply, of which Sir Percy Girouard is Director-General.”

While still in the War Office, Jackson and FW3A had, for a short period, come under the management of the Armaments Output Committee, but as a minor cog in the overall machinery of munitions production, they had been allowed to get on with their own business, however Sir Percy Girouard was to take a different stance when Section FW3A transferred into the Departments of Munitions Supply. At the time of the creation of the Ministry of Munitions, the provision of trench warfare stores by the War Office was split between FW3A, which had the most comprehensive range, either in production or in development, and the Directorate of Artillery, responsible for trench mortars, the service percussion grenades and the development of the Mills bomb. When the Munitions Output Committee transferred to the Ministry of Munitions it brought with it the responsibility for manufacturing those trench warfare munitions that were the responsibility of the Directorate of Artillery, and in organising his department, Girouard took the conventional artillerist view of treating trench mortars as specialised items of artillery and allocated them to the sub-department responsible for guns, whereas grenades went to the sub-department accountable for ammunition. When initially informed that FW3A would transfer into his department, Girouard assumed, not unreasonably, that he would become responsible for organising the production of their munitions as he had for other sections moved from the War Office, but this was not Dr Addison’s intention.

Addison does not appear to have discussed the transfer of Jackson's department with Girouard. It was Addison's intention that Jackson would become responsible for the Ministry's interest in trench warfare supplies, and placing his department in the Department of Munition Supply was a convenience that would allow the Trench Warfare Department to receive administrative support from the larger department while remaining financially and managerially independent. Girouard strongly objected to this arrangement, arguing that Addison had no authority to organise his department in this way or to dictate how he should allocate responsibilities for munitions production between his sub-departments, and proceeded to remove responsibility for grenade production from Jackson's department. Also, while aware of the agreement between Kitchener and Lloyd George that the Trench Warfare Department would retain both its research and manufacturing responsibilities, he argued that, as he was not a party to that agreement, he would interpret it as a suggestion rather than an instruction.

He informed Addison that, as research and development was not a stated function of the Ministry of Munitions, he could not be expected to alter the structure of his department to accommodate such an activity and initiated discussions with the Director of Artillery over the transfer of Jackson’s research activities. Jackson and Roger were appalled at these proposals and mounted a powerful rebuttal, pointing out that Girouard's proposals contradicted the agreements reached with Lord Kitchener. Moreover, the production of trench warfare munitions, by Munitions Supply, particularly trench mortars, was being sidelined by the powerful artillery lobby in the department that was reluctant, or unable, to divert resources into improving the functionality of those in service, with similar resource issues inhibiting improvements in the production of grenades. They further argued that the only way the Ministry would meet the increasing demand for trench warfare supplies was to concentrate their development and manufacture in the only department dedicated to their growth, the Trench Warfare Department. By the end of June, they had succeeded in convincing Dr Addison, who instructed Sir Percy Girouard to hand over responsibility for the manufacture of all grenades and trench mortars to the Trench Warfare Department.

‍ ‍ “Dear Girouard, Just a note to place on record what we have agreed today: (1) All matters connected with missiles used in trench warfare, including grenades, etc., to be dealt with by Jackson's department. (2) Will you please instruct which of your officers that has been dealing with grenades to see Roger, who is doing the business side of the work with Jackson to arrange matters. Discuss with Roger whether it is necessary to attach one of your officers to Jackson's dept.” [9]‍ ‍

Anticipating trouble if the Trench Warfare Department remained within the Departments of Munitions Supply, Addison removed it, creating a separate, independent department with Brigadier-General Jackson appointed Director-General, and the Trench Warfare Department became the fourth department in the Ministry of Munitions’ initial structure.[10] Sir Percy Girouard, who, according to Addison, was a challenging person to manage, was outraged by his authority being diminished by the removal of trench warfare stores from his control and over the next few weeks, he became an implacable critic of the Trench Warfare Department by resurrecting many of the criticisms initially raised by the Directorate of Artillery.

In this, he was not alone, for as soon as Section FW3A had transferred into the Ministry of Munitions, Jackson began to experience jealousy from managers in the Departments of Munitions Supply who resented him having individual control over the development of munitions and appearing to be free of much of the Ministry's bureaucracy, procedures, and policies. Moreover, instead of overseeing the repetitive production of standardised munitions whose designs did not change significantly, the Trench Warfare Department developed and manufactured a range of new, sexy weapons, such as flame projectors and chemical weapons. Eventually, Girouard spectacularly overstepped the mark when, without consulting Lloyd George, he invited the King to visit Coventry, accompanied by himself to represent the Minister. Lloyd George was incandescent and decided they must part company, and Sir Percy, after only six weeks in the Ministry, returned to Armstrong's. He was not the only military officer who would find it impossible to work with politicians.

[1] Christopher Addison, Four and a Half Years. A Personal Diary from June 1914 to January 1919. 2 Vols (London: Hutchinson & Co, 1934). Thursday, May 27, 1915, pp. 83-84

[2] ditto. Friday, May 28, 1915, p. 84

[3] ditto. Thursday, May 29, 1915, p. 85

[4] ditto.

[5] Ms Addison c72, folio 252: Llewellyn Smith to Brade.

[6] Addison, Four and a Half Years, p. 96

[7] Alexander Roger (1878-1961) was born in Aberdeenshire and educated at Robert Gordon College. At 18, he moved to London and trained as an accountant, becoming a successful businessman. Until July 1915, he directed the British Red Cross ambulances on the Western Front and then wrote to Lloyd George offering his services to the Ministry of Munitions. He was knighted in 1916 and, after the war, resumed his very successful business career.

[8] Addison preferred the shorter Trench Warfare Department, and that is the form I will adopt.   [

9] Ms Addison c72 folio 283-284: Addison to Girouard. 30 June 1915.

[10] ditto.